This paper presents an algorithm to construct cryptographically strong genus 2 curves and their Kummer surfaces via Rosenhain invariants and related Kummer parameters. The most common version of the complex multiplication (CM) algorithm for constructing cryptographic curves in genus 2 relies on the well-studied Igusa invariants and Mestre's algorithm for reconstructing the curve. On the other hand, the Rosenhain invariants typically have much smaller height, so computing them requires less precision, and in addition, the Rosenhain model for the curve can be written down directly given the Rosenhain invariants. Similarly, the parameters for a Kummer surface can be expressed directly in terms of rational functions of theta constants. CM-values of these functions are algebraic numbers, and when computed to high enough precision, LLL can recognize their minimal polynomials. Motivated by fast cryptography on Kummer surfaces, we investigate a variant of the CM method for computing cryptographically strong Rosenhain models of curves (as well as their associated Kummer surfaces) and use it to generate several example curves at different security levels that are suitable for use in cryptography.
Introduction
The extension of the Atkin-Morain complex multiplication (CM) algorithm [1] from elliptic curves to abelian surfaces began with the work of Spallek in 1994 [31] . In the two decades since then, the CM method in genus 2 has undergone a vast range of improvements, both theoretical and computational, which were motivated in large part by its application to generating abelian surfaces for use in cryptography. For a long time, the CM method was the only practical way to find abelian surfaces suitable for deployment; while Schoof's classical point counting algorithm [28] was more than efficient enough to find cryptographic curves in genus 1, the genus 2 analogue [27] was originally too slow to count points on abelian surfaces with cardinalities large enough to match their elliptic curve counterparts. Nowadays, genus 2 point counting has become more efficient, such that (with enough computing power) one can find cryptographically strong Jacobians of size up to 256 bits [17] suitable for the 128-bit security level. When targeting higher security levels, however, counting points still appears too slow to find suitable genus 2 curves, and it is likely that the 192-and 256-bit security levels will remain out of reach of the Schoof-Pila algorithm for some time. On the other hand, the CM method can be used to efficiently construct cryptographically strong abelian surfaces at any foreseeable security level. Moreover, a state-of-the-art implementation [14] computes class polynomials for CM fields of class number well beyond 10 4 , which essentially guarantees that the CM method can be used to find secure curves over any specific prime field: a larger search pool of CM fields means that implementers can fix their favorite prime characteristic p in advance, and can then expect to find such a CM field K where the splitting of p in O K gives rise to almost prime group order(s) and thus strong cryptographic curves.
In this paper we present a variant of the CM method in genus 2. Our primary motivation is the advent of 'Kummer cryptography': based on observations by Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky [10] , Gaudry showed that working on the Kummer surface associated to a genus 2 Jacobian, rather than the Jacobian itself, results in large performance gains in the realm of public-key cryptography [15] . Just like the Jacobian variety, the Kummer surface, denoted by K, can be embedded into projective space via the use of theta constants with half integer characteristics. For hyperelliptic curves of the form C : y 2 = f (x), this embedding is linked to the roots of f (x) (cf. [34] ), and hence is also related to the Rosenhain invariants of C: for a genus 2 curve with f (x) = 6 i=1 (x − u i ), over the algebraic closure, any three of the u i can be mapped to 0, 1 and ∞ using linear fractional transformations to write C in Rosenhain form as
where λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 are called 'the' Rosenhain invariants of C. Gaudry gives explicit relations between the constants defining the Kummer surface K and the Rosenhain invariants [15, § 4] , which can be used to write down C λ given the coefficients of K, and vice versa. We propose an algorithm to construct cryptographically strong genus 2 curves and their Kummer surfaces via Rosenhain invariants and the related Kummer parameters. The main benefits of the proposed approach include the following:
-The Rosenhain invariants satisfy minimal polynomials whose coefficients are much smaller than the coefficients of the Igusa class polynomials, which means that less precision is required in the computations. -The equation of the curve C = C λ (1.1) is immediate once the Rosenhain invariants are found, in contrast to Igusa invariants, where the Mestre-Cardona-Quer algorithm [9, 24] is required in order to find the equation for C. -Minimal polynomials for Kummer parameters can be computed in the same way as those of the Rosenhain invariants. These provide a direct way of determining the Kummer surfaces over a finite field F p , by taking a compatible system of roots. This avoids square root extractions required when computing K from C (cf. [6, § 5.2] ), which can give rise to Kummer surface parameters not defined over the ground field F p . To understand the trade-offs involved in this approach, we must consider the following issues:
-While the coefficients of the Rosenhain class polynomials are much smaller than their Igusa counterparts, the degrees of the Rosenhain polynomials are generally (though not always) larger † . -The method does not lend itself to finding cryptographic curves with Jacobian of prime order, since the entire 2-torsion is rational (that is, defined over F p ) when the Rosenhain model is defined over F p , and thus 16 divides the group order. To address the first point, we study the relationship between the degrees of the Igusa and Rosenhain invariants, and show that the degree increases by a small factor which depends on how the prime 2 splits in the CM field. In practice we can use our formulas to predict the degree of the Rosenhain invariants (or a small multiple of the degree) before computing them, which can help with recognizing their minimal polynomials when using algorithms based on LLL. We also give an algorithm for computing the Galois conjugates of the invariants, which can be used to compute minimal polynomials directly without LLL.
The second point above turns out to be a benefit, rather than a drawback. While prime order groups provide the best ratio of security to bit-length, the last decade of research has shown several benefits of using curves with a small amount of rational torsion. For elliptic curves, allowing rational 2-and 4-torsion points can facilitate much more efficient cryptography via the Montgomery model [26] or variants of the Edwards model [5, 12] , while in genus 2 the abelian surfaces via rosenhain invariants benefits are even more extreme: operation counts for Gaudry's formulas [15] estimate that allowing rational 2-torsion in order to use the Kummer surface can give rise to cryptographic operations which are more than twice as fast as working on a prime-order Jacobian [3] , and this was confirmed both by recent performance results in [6] (which compared the two) and in [4] (which pushed the relative Kummer performance even further ahead). Furthermore, recent work by Lubicz and Robert [23] shows that it can be advantageous to allow at least one more rational small-torsion point in addition to the full 2-torsion, in order to facilitate 'compatible' additions on the Kummer surface (D. Robert, private communication, December 2013). The conclusion is that abelian surfaces constructed for state-of-the-art cryptography will have rational 2-torsion anyway. In addition, the Rosenhain polynomials can sometimes be used to deduce, for a specific CM field, congruence conditions on the primes p where all the 2-torsion is rational (Example 2 was chosen to illustrate this).
We give several tables with experimental data reflecting the degrees of the invariants and the size of the coefficients. Tables 2 and 3 show the degree of the Rosenhain invariants as it relates to the decomposition of the prime 2 in the CM field K. Table 4 summarizes the coefficient size for a number of examples which were used to find cryptographically strong curves at different security levels.
Theta functions, Rosenhain invariants, and Kummer surfaces
We give the basic theory of theta functions in § 2.1, set our choice of Rosenhain invariants in § 2.2, and recall the Kummer surface parameters in terms of theta functions in § 2.3. In this section we describe everything over the complex numbers. Let H n = {Ω ∈ M n (C) : Ω t = Ω, Im Ω is positive definite} denote the n-dimensional Siegel upper half-space parameterizing n-dimensional principally polarized abelian varieties.
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Kummer surfaces
Kummer surfaces for use in cryptography can also be described directly in terms of their parameters, written as rational functions of the theta constants. We employ Cosset's reformulation [11] of Gaudry's Kummer surface description [15] . The first four theta constants
can be used to define a model for the level 2 Kummer variety K associated to the abelian surface corresponding to τ . Further defining
, E = 4E 2 abcd, then the projective surface K = K(x, y, z, t) is defined by
In addition to the four constants E , F, G, H that define the surface, routines for cryptographic scalar multiplications on K require six additional constants that appear in the (pseudo-)group law formulas:
Together with the four constants in (2.2), the above six constants are all that is needed to instantiate cryptographic scalar multiplications on K; see [15] and [11] for the associated algorithms. The constant point (a, b, c, d) is the zero element for the (pseudo-)group law on K.
The double-cover J C λ → K maps inverse divisors on the Jacobian of C λ to the same element on K; it also identically maps inverse points on J C λ to K, where C λ is the non-trivial quadratic twist of C λ , which means that a random point on K can be pulled back (via the formulas in [11, 15] ) to either J C λ or J C λ . Therefore, following an observation made in [2] , in state-ofthe-art Kummer cryptography it is essential that C λ is chosen to be twist-secure, that is, that both J C λ and J C λ have almost prime group orders.
The relation between the Kummer surface parameters and the Rosenhain invariants is given explicitly in [15] as
The CM method for abelian surfaces
The goal of using the CM method in cryptography is to generate (smooth, projective, irreducible) curves over a finite field with a given number of points on the Jacobian. The complex analytic version of the CM method for genus 2 has been proposed, implemented and improved in [14, 31-33, 35, 36] . We do not discuss the p-adic [16] or CRT [13] versions of the method here. The method works by relating the number of points on the Jacobian of the curve over a finite field F p to the endomorphism ring of the Jacobian of the curve. In the ordinary case, the endomorphism ring determines a CM field K, and then the problem becomes constructing abelian varieties with CM by the field K. This is accomplished by computing the CM points on H 2 and evaluating certain modular functions at those points. These values are algebraic numbers lying in some large number field. In order to recognize the invariants of the curve or variety over a finite field, we first compute the minimal polynomial over Q (or some extension field of Q), and then reduce modulo the prime p to find its roots. The rest of this section will explain these steps in detail and give the algorithm we use for evaluating Rosenhain invariants.
Determining the number of points
A (smooth, projective, irreducible) curve over a finite field F p has a Frobenius endomorphism, and in genus 2 this endomorphism has a quartic characteristic polynomial f (t) = t 4 − s 1 t 3 + s 2 t 2 − ps 1 t + p 2 . If the curve is ordinary and f is irreducible, let K be the quartic CM field defined by the polynomial f and fix an embedding of K into the complex numbers. Let π be a complex root of the polynomial f (t). The roots of f consist of conjugate pairs (π, π) and (π , π ), with the property π π = ππ = p, and these are called 'Weil p-numbers'. If a solution to ππ = p exists in the field K, then the ideal p = (π) in O K has relative norm pp = p. So to determine the possible group orders of abelian surfaces over F p with CM by K, it suffices to factor the ideal pO K and look for principal generators of the factors.
Thus, given a CM field K and a prime p, the ordinary genus 2 curves over F p with CM by K (that is, with End(J C ) ∼ = O K ) correspond to generators of principal ideals with relative norm p such that |π| = √ p. Note that a generator may have to be scaled by a unit in K to ensure
, in order to know the possible group orders for genus 2 curves with CM by K, it suffices to find the prime ideal decomposition of p in O K (which determines all possible πs). For primes which split completely into principal ideals in the reflex field of K, there are always two possible group orders when K = Q(ζ 5 ) is Galois cyclic and four possible group orders when K is non-Galois (see [13, Proposition 4] for the possibilities).
In our application, we generate many CM fields K for which we can compute the minimal polynomials of the Rosenhain invariants, and then we sieve through primes p (of a special form which are advantageous for implementation) until the pair (p, K) gives rise to group orders suitable for cryptography.
Computing CM points on the moduli space
An abelian variety of dimension n over C is analytically isomorphic to C n /Λ for some lattice Λ with a non-degenerate Riemann form; this form induces a polarization on the abelian variety. As above, let H n be the Siegel upper half plane parameterizing polarized abelian varieties of dimension n. By constructing a symplectic basis for the lattice with respect to the Riemann form, we can write Λ as Λ = Z n + τ Z n where τ ∈ H n . Any Jacobian variety of a curve has a principal polarization induced by the curve. In particular, we focus on two-dimensional abelian varieties that are Jacobians of genus 2 curves. Our first goal will be to compute at least one τ given the endomorphism ring.
An abelian variety of dimension n over C is called a CM abelian variety if its endomorphism ring is isomorphic to an order in the ring of integers of a CM number field of degree 2n. We will focus here on the case where the endomorphism ring is isomorphic to the maximal order O K . A CM number field K is an imaginary quadratic extension of a totally real field K 0 of degree n.
A CM type (K, Φ) is a pair where K is a CM field and Φ is a set of n complex embeddings of K, Φ = {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } such that φ i = φ j , ρφ j for i = j where ρ is complex conjugation. A CM type is called simple if it is not lifted from a CM type strictly contained in K. Let a be an ideal of K and let O K be the ring of integers of K. Then
forms a lattice in C n with CM by O K . The corresponding abelian variety is said to have CM of type (K, Φ). We only study simple CM types of dimension 2. Thus we restrict to quartic CM number fields K where K/Q is either Galois cyclic or non-Galois, avoiding the biquadratic case where the Galois group is the Klein 4-group because (K, Φ) is not simple [30, pp. 63-65] .
To compute τ , we must also specify the Riemann form on Φ(a). To do so, we use the following theorems of Shimura and Taniyama [30, Chapter 2, Theorem 4]: if K 0 is the real quadratic subfield and ξ is such that
is a simple type, then all principal polarizations of type (K, Φ) on C n /Φ(a) are given by such ξ. Shimura and Taniyama also prove that two principally polarized simple abelian varieties (C n /Φ(a), ξ 1 ) and (C n /Φ(b), ξ 2 ) of the same type are isomorphic if and only if there exists γ ∈ K such that γa = b and ξ 1 = γγξ 2 [30, Chapter 2, Proposition 14, and p. 107]. Together, these theorems give an algorithm to compute the principally polarized CM abelian varieties with CM by K up to isomorphism. This algorithm was first proposed by Spallek [31] and then implemented robustly by van Wamelen [35] and Weng [36] for the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve. In particular, when K 0 has class number 1, Weng and Spallek gave a closed form for the entries of the period matrices for all isomorphism classes of principally polarized abelian varieties with CM by K. For our results, we implemented the following algorithm which is an extension of [ 
(vi) Compute a symplectic basis of B = {e 1 , e 2 , f 1 , f 2 } of Φ(a) with respect to the symplectic form z, w = tr(ξzw). Then
,
Igusa class polynomials
Let {τ i } ∈ H 2 be the period matrices as output by Algorithm 1. The three Igusa invariants, j 1,i , j 2,i , j 3,i , are computed (via the evaluation of the theta functions) as functions of τ i , from which the Igusa class polynomials, H 1 (x), H 2 (x), H 3 (x), are constructed:
The purpose of this paper is to replace the Igusa class polynomials (in the CM method) by analogous polynomials obtained from the Rosenhain invariants, λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 . In both cases, there is a precise representation of the ideal defining the invariants (proposed for Igusa invariants in [16, § 3] ) which is more convenient than (3.1); we illustrate this modification for the Rosenhain polynomials in Examples 4 and 5.
Computing λ-invariants and Kummer surfaces
Similar to the Igusa invariants case, we compute the Rosenhain invariants as algebraic numbers by evaluating theta functions to high precision on the period matrices that are output by Algorithm 1. Recall that we are computing the following choice of Rosenhain invariants:
Computer algebra systems such as Magma and Sage have theta function implementations which can be used to compute the Rosenhain invariants as complex numbers with given precision. The bottleneck occurs when trying to recognize the Rosenhain invariants as algebraic numbers. For τ output by Algorithm 1, if we compute λ 1 (τ ), λ 2 (τ ), λ 3 (τ ) to enough precision, we can use the LLL algorithm [22] to recognize the minimal polynomials of the Rosenhain invariants.
In § 5 below, we compute a bound on (actually a multiple of) the degree of the minimal polynomials of the Rosenhain invariants which helps with the speed and accuracy of the LLL step. The parameters defining the Kummer surface are also written as rational functions in the theta constants, and the precise relationship with the Rosenhains was given in (2.3). In practice, we have recognized the Rosenhain invariants and Kummer invariants for many CM fields K with this approach, and used them to generate suitable curves and Kummer surfaces for cryptography; see § 6. However, the above algorithm does not produce all the Galois conjugates of the CM values of the Rosenhain functions. In the next section, we describe how to compute them.
Galois conjugates of a CM point
In this section we will explain how to compute the Galois conjugates of a CM value of the λ functions and their minimal polynomials. The algorithm we give here follows from the theory of complex multiplication and does not use Shimura's reciprocity law (see [38] for further explanation). We describe the algorithm in concrete terms. A self-contained and readable account of Shimura's explicit reciprocity law and its applications to computing the Galois conjugates of CM values of a modular function is given by Streng [33] . While Streng's work deals with a much more general case, we focus on the application to the Rosenhain invariants and give an algorithm for explicitly computing the Galois conjugates of a CM point and the minimal polynomials of Rosenhain invariants.
Preliminaries
Let (K, Φ) be a non-biquadratic quartic CM number field with CM type Φ = {σ 1 , σ 2 } and real quadratic subfield K 0 . Let (K r , Φ r ) be its reflex field and reflex CM type with real quadratic subfield K r 0 . Let M = KK r be the Galois closure of K and K r over Q; then Gal(M/Q) is either the dihedral group of order 8 or the cyclic group of order 4. Let
Let us identify {±1} ∼ = Z/2. For a principally polarized abelian surface (A, λ), the Weil pairing on the 2-torsion A[2] becomes a non-degenerate symplectic form:
Recall that X(2) = Γ(2)\H 2 is the coarse moduli space of the isomorphism classes of triples
is an ordered symplectic Z-basis with the following property. Let
We require Im τ > 0. In this case, τ ∈ X(2) gives the CM point, and the associated triple is (A a , λ, Φ(B)), where A = C 2 /Φ(a), λ is given by the symplectic form, Φ(B) = {Φ(e 1 ), Φ(e 2 ), Φ(f 1 ), Φ(f 2 )}, and Φ(a) = (σ 1 (a), σ 2 (a)) ∈ C 2 for a ∈ a. Furthermore, A[2] ∼ = 1 2 a/a, and the Weil pairing is given by
, where the left-hand side is the Weil pairing and the right-hand side is the symplectic pairing given by (4.2).
The action
Let CL(K r , Φ r , 2) be the quotient group of fractional ideals of K r which are prime to 2, modulo fractional ideals b, with the property
We call this group the CM class group of K r of type Φ r and level 2. Let H(2) be the associated class field of K r with the canonical isomorphism
By the theory of complex multiplication, a CM point τ = (a, ξ, B) of CM type (K, Φ) is defined over H (2) . We now describe the image of τ under the action of σ b −1 .
Step
is a CM point of CM type (K, Φ). Note that a symplectic basis can be computed using the FrobeniusFormAlternating command in Magma, or the symplecticform command in Sage.
Step 2: To get σ b −1 τ , we need to modify the symplectic basis
Step 3: [2] , and that
Then, by the main theorem of complex multiplication [29] , we have:
Before the next subsection, we give a brief justification of the above steps (see [38, § 3] for a proof and generalization). Clearly the above definition depends only on the class of [b]. Let s be a finite idele of K r such that s v = 1 for a prime v|2 of K r , and that the ideal of s is (s) = b −1 . Then [29, Theorem 5.15 ] asserts that σ s (A a ) = A a N Φ r (b) and it moves a 2-torsion point
Our construction gives
Notice that {αe i , αf i , i = 1, 2} does not in general give a Z-basis of a N Φ r (b). However, our modification γ(B ) is a symplectic Z-basis of a N Φ r (b) which satisfies
This justifies our construction.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1112/S1461157014000370
The minimal polynomial of Rosenhain invariants
Now it is easy to compute class and minimal polynomials of λ j (τ ), j = 1, 2, 3, over K r .
Step 4: For each class [b] ∈ CL(K r , Φ r , 2), choose a representative ideal b and compute
Step 5: Compute the class polynomial of λ j (τ )
It is defined over K r by construction. It is actually defined over the real quadratic field K r 0 of K r if at least one of the values λ j (τ b ) is (recognizable as) real, as the Fourier coefficients of λ j are defined over Q. To get the minimal polynomial, we do the same, except that we use only one λ j (τ b ) value in the case where more than one are the same value. This minimal polynomial is also defined over K r 0 when λ j (x) is. Although the coefficients of λ j (x) can have denominators, we can clear the denominators by multiplying by some integer, which is given by formulas proved independently by Yang [37] and then by Lauter and Viray [21] for more general CM fields. Actually using the result in [8] , one can compute the norm of λ j (τ ) ∈ Q with a precise factorization.
Remark 1. We get the other conjugates over Q by varying the CM type to obtain the minimal polynomial over Q. Note, though, that when working over a finite field F p , we often work under the assumption that p splits completely in the reflex field. In that case we could directly use the minimal polynomial arising from one CM type modulo p. Also, an anonymous reviewer commented that once we have computed a polynomial over K r 0 , there is actually no need to compute a second polynomial for the other CM type, since we may simply apply the real conjugation map to the first polynomial.
In the remainder of the paper, we compute minimal polynomials for the λ i by the method described in § 3.4 above, using LLL to recognize minimal polynomials over Q, instead of the method just described which computes all conjugates. This often leads to polynomials which have different degree for λ i and λ j , and makes it difficult to find a nice representation for the ideal which represents the CM points precisely on the moduli space. In fact, the Lagrange interpolation method from [16, § 3] will work smoothly when using the same set of CM points, for example, the orbit set just described in this section where all three polynomials have the same degree (all over K r 0 ) but might not be irreducible.
5.
Comparing the degree of Igusa and Rosenhain invariants
Degree of Igusa invariants
In order to understand the potential advantage of computing genus 2 curves via their Rosenhain invariants, we need to compare the degrees of Igusa and Rosenhain invariants. Equations (3.1) define the Igusa class polynomials, but they are not necessarily irreducible over Q, as can be seen already from the examples of genus 2 CM curves over Q given by van Wamelen [35] . Nonetheless, we will refer to the degree of the Igusa class polynomials as the degree of the invariants. In other words, it is the number of principally polarized abelian surfaces with CM by K, which is equal to the number of period matrices output by In what follows we denote the order of the class group Cl(K) of K, by h = |Cl(K)|, and the order of the quotient h − = h − (K) = |Cl(K)|/|Cl(K 0 )|.
Degree of Rosenhain invariants
Next we will relate the degree of the Rosenhain invariants to h − . We define the degree of the Rosenhain invariants to be the degree of the polynomials λ i (x) defined in equation (4.5). In § 4.2 above, we used the fact that the CM values λ i (τ ) lie in the field H(2), an extension of K r of degree h Φ r 2 = |CL(K r , Φ r , 2)|. Thus the Rosenhain invariants lie in a field of degree at most 4h Φ r 2 over Q. In what follows we will relate h Φ r 2 to h − . In [25, Theorem 1.7, p. 146], an exact sequence is given which relates the ray class group with modulus m of a number field K to the class group of K. To simplify, we will assume here that the modulus m is a product of prime ideals p of O K , (finite primes), with some multiplicity m(p), and in particular in our application we will take m to be the modulus 2O K (or sometimes 2O K0 ). This exact sequence can be used to understand the relationship between h Φ r 2 and h − :
is the group of fractional ideals of K prime to m, modulo principal ideals generated by elements of K m,1 , where
Thus the order of C m is given by the formula
Proof. Apply the above exact sequence twice, for C m (K) and C m0 (K 0 ). Now in the case at hand, m 0 = 2O K0 and m = 2O K , let h 2 = |C m |. We can determine c(K) fairly precisely because the following proposition shows that the contribution from the unit terms is 1, except when K = Q(ζ 5 ), and in that case we have c(Q(ζ 5 )) = 1. Proof. The case K = Q(ζ 5 ) can be handled with a straightforward calculation. Assume now K = Q(ζ 5 ) so that the only roots of unity in K are ±1. Let u be a unit of K; then there is a positive integer n such that u n = a is a unit of K 0 by the Dirichlet unit theorem. So (ū) n = a and (u/ū) n = 1. This impliesū = ±u. Ifū = u, u ∈ U (K 0 ), we are done. Ifū = −u, u 2 = − for a totally positive unit of K 0 and K = K 0 (u) = K 0 ( √ − ). Then K r 0 = Q(
, where is the real conjugate of . This contradicts the assumption that K is non-biquadratic.
Part (ii) follows from part (i).
It follows from Proposition 5.2 that the value of c(K) is completely determined by the splitting behavior of the prime in K 0 and K. A case-by-case calculation for each possible decomposition yields the following proposition:
Proposition 5.3. Let m 0 = 2O K0 and m = 2O K and c(K) as in Corollary 5.1. Then the value of c(K) is given by Table 1 according to the splitting of 2 in K 0 and K. Table 1 .
Both ramified Both split (in K) 9 4 1 1 inert, 1 ramified 1 inert, 1 split 1 ramified, 1 split (in K) 6 3 2
Although h Φ r 2 = |Cl(K r , Φ r , 2)| is not equal to h − 2 (K), it is typically a factor of h − 2 (K). One can show the following claim (up to a small 2-power factor) via careful analysis on various class groups and type norms: if we write the degree of the Igusa class polynomials as c · h − (K), then the Rosenhain polynomials have degree which is a factor of c · h − 2 (K)2 r . In other words, h Φ r 2 | h − 2 (K)2 r for some small non-negative integer r. Therefore, the quotient of the degree of the Rosenhain polynomials by the degree of the Igusa class polynomials is a factor of c(K) (up to a small 2-power factor). In Tables 2 and 3 below we give examples of all of these cases.
Data for degrees of Rosenhain invariants
Here we present some data for h − and h − 2 , and compare it with the degree of minimal polynomials for the λs. We list examples according to the class number h of K, the splitting of 2 in O K , and the discriminants of the number fields Q(λ i ) generated by the λ i . Note that in all cases, the maximum degree of the λ i actually divides 4h − 2 as explained in § § 4.2 and 5.2 above, but also that it can be significantly smaller.
The notation in Tables 2 and 3 In Tables 2 and 3 , the degree of λ i refers to the degree of the minimal polynomial of λ i , not the degree of the polynomials defined in (4.5). Question marks indicate that either the factorization or the LLL computation did not terminate yet. Tables 2 and 3 contain examples for all possible splittings of the prime 2 in O K , exhibiting all possible values for c(K) given in Proposition 1. There are some blocks where the splitting is ambiguous in the tables. In the D 4 -case h = 1 and (2) = p 1 p 2 , for the first two lines, (2) is inert, then split, whereas for the third line (2) is split, then inert. In the D 4 -case h = 2 and (2) = p 2 , for the first three lines (2) is inert and then ramified, and in the last two lines (2) is ramified and then inert.
Experimental results and examples
Comparing the formulas for Rosenhain invariants (2.1) with the formulas for Igusa invariants, in terms of the products of even theta constants, we can see directly from comparing the weights of the modular forms which appear in the numerators and denominators (weight 2 for Rosenhains, weight 60 at worst for Igusas) that the height of the Rosenhain invariants is likely to be much less, therefore requiring less precision to compute. The same is true for the Kummer invariants, where the required precision is often much smaller. Indeed, quotients of theta constants examined in [33] also are quotients of modular forms of low weight and they too have much smaller height and smaller coefficients than the Igusa polynomials. By the same argument given there [33, § 6.1], because the coefficients of the minimal polynomial are so much smaller, we need much less precision in order to recognize the minimal polynomial via LLL. This is one of the advantages of our approach: decreasing the amount of precision needed in computation.
On the other hand, the cost of our approach is that the Rosenhain and Kummer invariants lie in a potentially larger extension field, so they may have larger degree. As explained in § 4.2 above, the CM values of the λ functions lie in the extension H(2)/K r of the reflex field. Thus the degree of their minimal polynomials over Q is potentially as large as 4 · # Gal(H(2)/K r ) = 4 · h Φ r 2 or degree h Φ r 2 over K r . We find though, surprisingly, that often the CM λ-values satisfy minimal polynomials over Q with much smaller degree. We found cases, for example, where the Rosenhain and Igusa invariants satisfy minimal polynomials over Q of the same degree, as in the following example. where the coefficients are at most 18 bits. Both the Rosenhain and the Igusa invariants have degree 4 over Q in this case, but the Rosenhain invariants require less precision to recognize.
Finding genus 2 curves and Kummer surfaces for cryptography
To generate the examples we present in this work, we computed minimal polynomials over Q of both Rosenhain and Kummer CM-values for many different CM fields K with small class number. We then searched over many primes of a special form p = 2 s −c or p = 2 s−1 −c, pseudo-Mersenne primes for s = 128, 192, 256, which are advantageous for efficient implementations of curve-based cryptography. For each prime p, we checked all the CM fields K in our list, using the method described in § 3.1, to see if the number of points over F p on the Jacobian of a curve with CM by K could be suitable for use in cryptography.
Our search was designed to return only those CM fields K and primes p where (i) 2 4 = 16 divides the two matching curve-twist group orders † , and (ii) when all small powers of 2 were removed from each such group order, the remaining factor was a large prime.
To continue with Example 1 above, the prime p = 2 127 − 28719 splits into four principal ideals in O K . Two of the four possible group orders for J C λ (F p ) are N = 2 6 · r and N = 2 4 · r , where r = 2 248 +r and r = 2 250 −r are 249-and 250-bit primes, witĥ r = 35436667276190183469610103700485440976624669707312674945, r = 141746669104761955446228299558628861917994511630039822125.
The minimal polynomials for the λ-invariants (6.1) all split completely in F p [x]. In this case there are two roots of λ 1 (x) that match up with roots of λ 2 (x) and λ 3 (x) to give rise to curves C λ such that #J C λ (F p ) = N and #J C λ (F p ) = N .
Another advantage of this approach is that the curve is given directly by the Rosenhain invariants in the form C λ : y 2 = x(x−1)(x−λ 1 )(x−λ 2 )(x−λ 3 ). Note that when the Rosenhain model is defined over F p , with λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 ∈ F p , then all of the 2-torsion on the Jacobian of the curve is defined over F p , that is, #J C λ (F p )[2] = 16, because it is generated by the Weierstrass points on the curve.
Splitting of Rosenhain polynomials modulo primes
We can give a condition on primes which ensures that the Rosenhain polynomials split completely modulo those primes. It follows from class field theory that if a rational prime, p, splits completely in K r into principal prime ideals with generators which are congruent to 1 mod 2, then the prime p will split completely in the ray class field of K r modulo 2.
For example, for the field K = Q[x]/(x 4 + 13x 2 + 13), where h 2 (K) = 5, the λ-polynomials have degree 20. There is only one prime less than 1000 for which that condition holds, p = 757, and the lambda polynomials split completely modulo 757:
Existence of a Kummer surface over F p
Another potential advantage of the Rosenhain approach is that, for a fixed CM field K, we can sometimes determine congruence conditions on the prime p which must hold in order to find a Kummer surface over F p (arising as the quotient of a Jacobian variety with CM by K). When the minimal polynomials λ i (x) split completely in F p , then as just remarked, all of the † Two-torsion is shared by a curve and its quadratic twist, so this is necessary, but not sufficient (cf. Example 2), to find a rational Kummer surface over Fp.
2-torsion on the Jacobian of the curve is defined over F p . This is a necessary condition for the Kummer surface to be defined over F p . The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2. The non-Galois quartic CM field K = Q[x]/(x 4 + 5x 2 + 2) has class number 1 with K 0 = Q( √ 17). The prime p = 2 256 − 1204385 splits into four principal ideals in O K , and there are two possible suitable group orders, N = 2 6 · r and N = 2 6 · r , where r = 2 506 +r and r = 2 506 −r are the 507-and 506-bit primes given bŷ r = 1042069017142527808074607196449149476090722442842106883749718550538937655101283257400133472983552933838816961141335, r = 1042069017142527808074607196449161749125921965770655297925581003982254064511088864103924137074740555751503901721761.
In this example, the Igusa class polynomials have degree 2 and coefficients with size up to 28 bits † . Running Mestre's algorithm on triples of Igusa invariants (j 1 , j 2 , j 3 ) produces the curves with group orders N and N . In both cases we soon find that the 2-torsion is not entirely defined over F p . While we cannot predict this from the Igusa class polynomials, it is readily apparent from the Rosenhain minimal polynomials:
The third polynomial λ 3 (x) has roots in F p [x] if and only if p ≡ 1 mod 4. Furthermore, we see (experimentally) that λ 1 (x) and λ 2 (x) only have roots in F p [x] when p ≡ 1 mod 8. In some cases, the Rosenhain polynomials associated to certain CM fields can be used to derive analogous congruence conditions to rule out primes p where the entire 2-torsion is not defined over F p . This was mentioned in the specific case of K = Q(ζ 5 ) in [6] .
Kummer surfaces for cryptography
In both [6] and [4] , record timings for scalar multiplications on Kummer surfaces were announced, competitive with Diffie-Hellman groups arising from elliptic curves. In [6, Tables 4  and 6 ], minimal polynomials for Kummer invariants were given for two CM fields (computed in a different way than in the present paper). In Table 4 , the minimal polynomials for the parameters had very small roots in some cases, for example y 0 = t 0 = 1, which helps to speed up scalar multiplication on these surfaces. But the group orders for those CM fields were not suitable for cryptography over primes fields where the minimal polynomials split. Unfortunately we have not yet found other examples where the parameters for the Kummer surface and its arithmetic are as nice, but here are some examples where we computed the minimal polynomials for the Kummer surface parameters, and produced pairs (p, K) suitable for cryptography. In this case, the Kummer polynomials have degree 2 or 4, while the Igusa class polynomials have degree 2 and coefficients of size up to 61 bits † . This time the Rosenhain polynomials have degree 8, and have coefficients whose size are at most 27 bits: 
The defining polynomials have degree either 2, 4, or 8, whereas the Igusa class polynomials have degree 2 and coefficients with size up to 71 bits † . On the other hand, the Rosenhain polynomials are all of degree 4 and have coefficients whose size are at most 13 bits: Letλ 1 be any root of λ 1 (x). Here we can use the modified Lagrange interpolation [16, § 3] to rewrite the matching roots of λ 2 (x) and λ 3 (x) as functions ofλ 1 , given as
Using this representation, we only need to solve for rootsλ 1 of λ 1 (x), from which we compute the matching (λ 2 ,λ 3 ) pair directly from (6.5). Over F p , a consistent set of the ten Kummer parameters are the following roots of the polynomials in (6. 
Table of examples
In Table 4 , we summarize the Rosenhain polynomials corresponding to eight different example CM fields; four are Galois and four are non-Galois. Four of the examples we have already explained and the details of the remaining four examples are provided in a more condensed form in the Appendix. These examples provide a list of cryptographic curves that are suitable for implementation at a range of security levels. Table 4 is as follows. For each CM field K = Q[x]/(x 4 + Ax 2 + B) of class number h K , we give the degree over Q (deg) and maximum bitlength over all coefficients (coeff) of the first Igusa class polynomial, H 1 (x), and over all coefficients of the three Rosenhain polynomials λ 1 (x), λ 2 (x) and λ 3 (x) corresponding to K. We only give the bitlength of H 1 (x) because H 2 (x) and H 3 (x) are not needed when using the representation proposed in [16, § 3] ). For each K, we also give a cryptographically strong, twist-secure curve C, whose Jacobian has CM by O K ; the table reports the bitlengths of the underlying field characteristic p and the large prime factors r and r , as well as the curve-and-twist cofactors h and h , such that #J C λ (F p ) = hr and #J C λ (F p ) = h r . Table 1 highlights the trend observed in the majority of examples we computed; namely, that the Rosenhain polynomials have coefficients which are much smaller than the coefficients of the Igusa class polynomials in most cases.
The notation in

Additional torsion
For a curve C λ with λ-invariants in F p , #J C λ (F p )[2] = 2 4 , so if a higher power of 2 divides the group order #J C λ (F p ), then there must be some additional 2-power torsion. In Table 4 where all curves have F p -rational λ-invariants, only the curves in Examples 6 and 7 have no higher 2-power torsion.
When there is at least one additional small-torsion point on J C λ or J C λ , then the technique from [23] (see also D. Robert, private communication, December 2013) allows for 'compatible' additions on the Kummer surface K. So in some cases, it may be worthwhile to allow an extra factor of 2 in the cofactor in order to take advantage of this technique.
Here we give an additional example with this feature which could be useful in cryptography. Continuing with the CM field from Example 4 above, the quartic CM field K = Q[x]/(x 4 + 12x 2 + 18) has class number h K = 2 and K 0 = Q( √ 2). We can give another example over this CM field with only one extra 2 in the cofactor. The prime p = 2 191 − 830439 splits into 4 principal ideals in O K . Two possible group orders for Jacobians of curves C with CM by K are N = 2 4 · r and N = 2 5 · r , where r = 2 378 −r and r = 2 377 +r are 378-bit primes witĥ r = 27145707237528389726742606066121237906741397221275189669901645158791934103076877051777, r = 13572853618764194863370977236789991112677548782757889556987587506326996397536581679559.
The first Rosenhain polynomial, λ 1 (x) in (6.4), splits completely in F p [x]. Substituting any one of its roots,λ 1 , into (6.5) gives a triple (λ 1 ,λ 2 ,λ 3 ) with #J C λ (F p ) = N and #J C λ (F p ) = N . The prime p = 2 256 −1405067 splits into 4 principal ideals in O K . There are two possible group orders for #J C λ (F p ) for curves C λ with CM by K, given by are N = 2 4 · r and N = 2 4 · r , where r = 2 508 +r and r = 2 508 −r are 509-and 508-bit primes, with (r,r ) = (3266146279590289616697288326643692977601759703506301403850455649701823577098001741197488639944233682641571217767825, 3266146279590289616697288326643733651499461058469703245103446399072893914517667448420904219450927907469641194338455).
The three Rosenhain polynomials in (A.1) split completely in F p [x]. For each of the two roots of λ 1 (x), precisely one root of λ 2 (x) and one root of λ 3 (x) gives rise to #J C λ (F p ) = N and #J C λ (F p ) = N . This time, only the 2-torsion is F p -rational on both J C λ and J C λ . where the coefficients are at most 21 bits. The prime p = 2 191 − 4657 is inert in O K0 but splits into two principal ideals in O K . The two possible group orders for J C λ (F p ) are N = 2 5 · r and N = 2 5 · r , where r = 2 377 +r † See http://echidna.maths.usyd.edu.au/cgi-bin/dbs/igusa cm invariants.py?D=5&A=35&B=245&raw=0. ‡ See http://echidna.maths.usyd.edu.au/cgi-bin/dbs/igusa cm invariants.py?D=17&A=15&B=52&raw=0. https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1112/S1461157014000370 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.70.40.11, on 02 Dec 2019 at 12:33:58, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at and r = 2 377 −r are 378-and 377-bit primes given bŷ r = 13814964007818296929562658172382786817112511302154194840738889014886339390073138377457, r = 13814964007818296929562659998729190799520323183340196264904950522076692315001749568595.
The polynomials λ 1 (x) and λ 2 (x) in (A.3) both have six roots in F p , while λ 3 (x) has four. There are three triples (of these roots) such that #J C λ (F p ) = N and #J C λ (F p ) = N .
